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We study the optimization of full implementation of the four-intensity decoy-state Measurement-
Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution (MDIQKD) over asymmetric and unstable quantum
channel. As was requested by the original 4-intensity protocol, Alice and Bob choose different four
intensities separately (i.e., 7 intensities for both sides including one vacuum and 6 non-vacuum).
We make the optimization with 12 independent parameters taking both the global optimization for
the independent parameters and the joint constraints through employing a gradient optimization
method. Compared with partial implementation, our full implementation of 4-intensity improves
the key rate by 1 to tens of times in typical experimental conditions. In addition, we present a
loss-compensation method with monitoring the channel loss. The numerical simulation shows that
the method can produce high key rate for both the asymmetric channel and the unstable channel.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.81.Gs, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides the com-
munication users with secure keys to encrypt their in-
formation. Bennett and Brassard proposed BB84 proto-
col [1] to realize QKD, but the lack of practical single-
photon sources limited the use of origin BB84 proto-
col. BB84 protocol with imperfect single-photon sources
would suffer from the photon-number-splitting (PNS) at-
tack [2–4]. This loophole can be fixed by the decoy-
state method [5–8]. With the decoy-state method, QKD
can be used in the practical system between users with
longer distace [9–11]. After that, measurement-device-
independent QKD (MDIQKD) was proposed to avoid
any loophole from the imperfect detection devices [12–
15]. Combined with decoy-state method, MDIQKD can
also avoid the loophole from the imperfect single-photon
sources [15, 16]. Nowadays, the decoy-state MDIQKD
has become the mainstream of the studies of quantum
key distribution both theoretically [16–29] and experi-
mentally [30–38]. The maximum distance of MDIQKD
has been experimentally increased to 404 kilometers [39].
In the scheme of decoy-state MDIQKD, at each time
the user Alice (Bob) randomly chooses her (his) basis,
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bit value and intensity to send a pulse in a corresponding
state, e.g. BB84 state in a polarization-coding MDIQKD,
to an untrusted third party (UTP) Charlie. Charlie per-
forms a collective measurement on each pulse pair and
announces the measurement result in the public channel.
After all pulses are sent, Alice and Bob announce the
bases and intensities they use. Based on all announce-
ment, Alice and Bob can calculate the yield and the error
rate of single-photon pulse pairs, and then distill the se-
cure key.
For the practical applications, the asymmetric and un-
stable channels are common cases both in fiber and free
space. For example, when we consider the quantum net-
work, due to the different geographical locations of users,
the channel losses can be largely different. And if we
want implement MDIQKD in free space, the channels are
always asymmetric and unstable too, due to the atmo-
spheric turbulence or moving sites (such as the satellite).
Although the security of MDIQKD doesn’t make any
assumption to the channel, the unstable and/or asym-
metric quantum channel decreases the key rate quite
a lot. Therefore, directly applying the origin decoy-
state MDIQKD in the asymmetric and unstable channel
doesn’t give a good performance. Here, we propose full
implementation of four-intensity decoy-state MDIQKD
protocol to largely increase the key rate in asymmet-
ric channels than previous protocol [40, 41]. Moreover,
a loss-compensation method is presented with optimiza-
tion to increase the performance of MDIQKD in unstable
channels.
2This paper is arranged as follows. We give full imple-
mentation of four-intensity decoy-state MDIQKD pro-
tocol and the method to optimize the source parame-
ters in Sec. II. Then we introduce our loss-compensation
method and the simulation method in Sec. III. We show
the numerical simulation results with parameters fully
optimized for both the asymmetric channel and the un-
stable channel in Sec. IV. We summarize in Sec. V.
II. FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF
FOUR-INTENSITY DECOY-STATE MDIQKD
PROTOCOL
As was stated in the original four-intensity decoy-state
method in [24], Alice and Bob each uses 4 different in-
tensities, including one vacuum. This means in general,
there are 7 different intensities for both sides with 6 in-
dependent parameters for non-vacuum intensities. To-
gether with the frequencies of using each intensities, there
are 12 independent parameters in general in the original
protocol. Also, the original 4-intensity protocol suggests
using the joint constraints [23]. A full implementation
means doing optimization among all those 12 parame-
ters with joint constraints fully.
Explicitly, in the original four-intensity decoy-state
method in [24], Alice (Bob) uses a source zA (zB) that
only emits photons in the Z basis, two sources xA and yA
(xB and yB) that only emit photons in the X basis and
a vacuum source oA (oB) that only emits vacuum pulses.
At each time, Alice (Bob) randomly chooses a source in
the four sources above to send a pulse, with probability
palA , l = z, x, y, o (pbrB , r = z, x, y, o). So we call it “four-
intensity protocol”. In photon number space, the density
matrices of the pulses from these sources can be written
as
ρlA =
∞∑
k=0
alk|k〉〈k|, l = x, y, z (1)
and
ρrB =
∞∑
k=0
brk|k〉〈k|, r = x, y, z. (2)
We assume that the states above satisfy these conditions:
ayk
axk
≥
ay2
ax2
≥
ay1
ax1
,
byk
bxk
≥
by2
bx2
≥
by1
bx1
(3)
for k > 2, so that the decoy-state results can apply. Fa-
miliar sources used in practice, such as weak-coherent-
state sources and heralded single-photon sources out of
the parametric-down conversion, satisfy the conditions
above.
In the following, we will omit the subscript A and B
in lA and rB if it doesn’t cause confusion.
A. Asymptotic case
We define the yield, the error yield and the error rate
as follow. Consider a pulse pair set C, which contains
NC pulse pairs totally. These pairs cause MC effective
counts and WC error counts. In this case, the yield SC =
MC/NC , the error yield TC = WC/NC and the error rate
EC =WC/MC .
The main idea of decoy state is that the yield of |m〉|n〉
photon pairs from different source pairs should be the
same in the asymptotic case, which means
〈slrmn〉 = 〈smn〉, l, r = x, y, z. (4)
Using Eq.(4) and the convex form of yield of lr source
pairs
〈Slr〉 =
∞∑
m,n=0
almbrn〈smn〉, (5)
we can calculate the lower bound of the yield of single-
photon pairs:
〈s11〉 ≥ 〈s11〉 =
S+ − S− − ay1by2H
ax1ay1(bx1by2 − bx2by1)
(6)
where
S+ = ay1by2〈Sxx〉+ax1bx2ay0〈Soy〉+ax1bx2by0〈Syo〉, (7)
S− = ax1bx2〈Syy〉+ ax1bx2ay0by0〈Soo〉 (8)
and
H = ax0〈Sox〉+ bx0〈Sxo〉 − ax0bx0〈Soo〉. (9)
Eq.(6) holds when
Ka =
ay1ax2
ax1ay2
≤
by1bx2
bx1by2
= Kb. (10)
In the case of Ka > Kb, the lower bound of s11 can be
calculated with Eqs.(6)-(9) by making exchange between
axk and bxk, and exchange between ayk and byk, for k =
1, 2.
Similarly, we can calculate the upper bound of phase-
flip error rate of single-photon pairs:
〈eph11 〉 ≤ 〈e
ph
11 〉 =
〈Txx〉 − H/2
ax1bx1〈s11〉
. (11)
With 〈s11〉 and 〈e
ph
11 〉, we can calculate the key rate by:
R = pzApzB{az1bz1〈s11〉[1−H(〈e
ph
11 〉)]− fSzzH(Ezz)}
(12)
where H(p) = −p ln p − (1 − p) ln(1 − p) and f is the
correction efficiency.
3B. Nonasymptotic case
In the nonasymptotic regime, we should consider the
statistical fluctuation of the observable, e.g. the differ-
ence between observed values and mean values. Given a
failure probability ǫ, the observed value SC of an observ-
able of a set C and its mean value 〈SC〉 satisfy:
−∆− ≤ SC − 〈SC〉 ≤ ∆+. (13)
If we perform a standard error analysis, ∆ can be given
by
∆− = ∆+ = γ
√
SC
NC
(14)
where NC is the number of elements in set C and γ = 5.3
given the failure probability ǫ = 10−7.
According to the idea of joint constraints of statistical
fluctuation [23], the set C can be either all pulse pairs
from a source pair, or the combination of all pulse pairs
from different source pairs. Taking all these joint con-
straints into consideration, the bound of 〈s11〉 and 〈e
ph
11 〉
can be calculated tighter.
As a joint term in 〈s11〉 and 〈e
ph
11 〉, H should fluctuate
jointly in Eq.(6) and Eq.(11), instead of taking the worst
case independently [24]. We regard R as a function of H,
scan H in its possible range and take the minimum R as
the final key rate:
R˜ = min
H∈[H,H]
R(H) (15)
C. Optimization of source parameters
In the numerical simulation, we will estimate what val-
ues we would observe for the yields and error rates in a
certain model and use these values to calculate the key
rate. So we can regard the key rate as a function of source
parameters:
R˜ = R˜(µax, µay, µaz , pax, pay, paz,
µbx, µby, µbz, pbx, pby, pbz) = R˜(~x)
(16)
where µal and µbr are the intensities of Alice’s and Bob’s
sources. If we use weak coherent state sources, the rela-
tion between the intensity and the photon number dis-
tribution is ak = e
−µ µ
k
k! .
In the calculation of the key rate, we need to take the
joint fluctuation and the scan of H into consideration.
In addition, the number of parameters we need to op-
timize is large. Therefore, normal optimization method
costs a lot of time. We should improve the optimization
method to get the optimal parameters quickly. Firstly,
we consider the “gradient” of the key rate function [29]:
∆R˜
∆xk
=
R˜(xk +∆xk, xi)− R˜(xk −∆xk, xi)
2∆xk
. (17)
In the case that both R˜(xk+∆xk, xi) and R˜(xk−∆xk, xi)
are less than R˜(xk, xi), we set
∆R˜
∆xk
= 0. With
∆R˜
∆~x
= (
∆R˜
∆x1
, · · · ,
∆R˜
∆x12
) (18)
we can find the direction that key rate increases the
fastest and get close to the optimal parameters quickly.
To avoid the case that the optimal parameters are the
local optimal point, which satisfies R˜(xk + ∆xk, xi) =
R˜(xk, xi) for any k, we search the points in the nearby
area to see whether there is higher key rate. Accurately,
we calculate the key rate R˜(xk+δk∆l); δk = −1, 0, 1; k =
1, · · · , 12 with a certain ∆l. If there are some points with
higher key rate, we jump to the point with highest key
rate in the nearby area and execute the above procedure
again.
In our simulation, we found that in most cases, the
gradient method brings us to the optimal point. But in
some cases, it brings us to the local optimal point.
III. LOSS-COMPENSATION METHOD
For the case of unstable channel, according to our
MDIQKD protocol, all source parameters should be de-
termined before the QKD process. Even though we can
detect the channel transmittance η at any time, we can-
not change the source parameters to optimize the key rate
at real time. With the source parameters fixed, there are
always some cases that the intensities at the two sides of
Charlie’s beam splitter deviate a lot, saying that µAηA
and µBηB deviate a lot. These cases will give a quite
high error rate that decreases the key rate a lot.
Consider the case that µAηA > µBηB. If we add some
extra loss η′A to the channel between Alice and Charlie
passively to satisfy µAηAη
′
A = µBηB as in [30], the ob-
served error rate will decrease, but the yield will decrease
at the same time due to the higher loss. The joint change
of error rate and yield may not increase the final key rate
a lot. If we add extra loss µBηB
µAηA
≤ η˜′A ≤ 1 to the channel
between Alice and Charlie, we can get a better key rate.
Given the transmittance and the intensities of sources,
the specific value of η˜′A can be determined by numerical
simulation.
According to our numerical results, when µAηA is close
to µBηB, we don’t need to add any extra loss (η˜
′
A = 1) in
the channel to get the best key rate. Suppose that we are
given the transmittance distribution {η
(1)
A , · · · , η
(i)
A , · · · }
and {η
(1)
B , · · · , η
(i)
B , · · · } and fixed µA, µB. When
η
(i)
A
η
(i)
B
> δ
for a certain δ, we should add some extra loss µBηB
µAηA
<
η˜′A < 1 to get the best best key rate. In the case that
µAηA < µBηB, we can add extra loss η˜
′
B to the channel
between Bob and Charlie similarly.
In the simulation of the unstable channel, sup-
pose that we have the transmittance distribu-
tion {η
(1)
A , · · · , η
(i)
A , · · · }, {η
(1)
B , · · · , η
(j)
B , · · · } and
4the corresponding probability {p
(1)
A , · · · , p
(i)
A , · · · },
{p
(1)
B , · · · , p
(j)
B , · · · }. We can calculate the “transmittance
pair” distribution {η
(1)
A ⊗η
(1)
B , · · · , η
(i)
A ⊗η
(j)
B , · · · } and the
corresponding probability {p
(1)
A ∗p
(1)
B , · · · , p
(i)
A ∗p
(j)
B , · · · }.
With a certain source pair lr and a certain transmittance
pair η
(i)
A ⊗ η
(j)
B , the observed yield Slr(η
(i)
A ⊗ η
(j)
B ) and
the observed error rate Elr(η
(i)
A ⊗ η
(j)
B ) can be calculated
as in [21] theoretically. Then the yield and the error
rate in the whole process can be calculated by
Slr =
∑
i,j
p
(i)
A ∗ p
(j)
B ∗ Slr(η
(i)
A ⊗ η
(j)
B ) (19)
and
Elr =
∑
i,j
p
(i)
A ∗ p
(j)
B ∗ Elr(η
(i)
A ⊗ η
(j)
B ). (20)
When the loss-compensation is performed, we can cal-
culate the Slr, Elr in the same way except the (ij)-
th transmittance pair is changed into η
(i)
A η˜
′ ⊗ η
(j)
B or
η
(i)
A ⊗ η
(j)
B η˜
′ if
η
(i)
A
η
(j)
B
> δ or
η
(j)
B
η
(i)
A
> δ, respectively.
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
First we consider the case that the channel is stable but
asymmetric. We show the optimized key rate in some
asymmetric cases in Fig.1 and some results in certain
distances in Table II with device parameters in Table I.
From Fig.1, we can find that with full implementation
of the four-intensity MDIQKD and full optimization of
the source parameters, the asymmetric channel doesn’t
decrease the key rate a lot at the same total distance.
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FIG. 1: Optimized key rate versus the total distance between
Alice and Bob with the device parameters in Table I.
Then for the unstable channel, we consider a simple
case that η
(i)
A = (3 + 2i)dB, η
(j)
B = (13 + 2j)dB with
Nt ηd d E
X
d E
Z
d f ǫ
1011 65% 8× 10−7 0.5% 0.5% 1.16 10−7
TABLE I: Device parameters for Table II.Nt: total number of
pulse pairs; ηd: detection efficiency of the detectors; d: dark
count rate of the detectors; EXd /E
Z
d : misalignment error rate
in the X/Z basis; f : correction efficiency; ǫ: failure proba-
bility for statistical fluctuation evaluation between observable
and the mean value.
LA(km) LB(km)
Optimized key rate per pulse pair
ours Ref.[41]
10 60 6.299 × 10−5 3.106 × 10−5
43 93 3.151 × 10−7 1× 10−8
50 100 6.576 × 10−8 4.786 × 10−11
30 60 3.117 × 10−5 1.445 × 10−5
59.3 89.3 2.972 × 10−7 1× 10−8
70 100 2.490 × 10−8 0
TABLE II: Optimized key rate at different distances with the
parameters in Table I.
probability p
(i)
A = p
(j)
B = 0.2 for i, j = 1, · · · , 5. We show
the key rate with different δ and η˜′ with source parame-
ters optimized. The case that δ = η˜′ = 0dB means that
we don’t perform the loss-compensation method. In the
case that δ = −7dB and η˜′ = 5dB, we can see that an im-
proper loss-compensation will decrease the key rate. We
can find that in this transmittance distribution, setting
δ = −8.75dB and η˜′ = 4.5dB can maximize the key rate
in our loss-compensation method.
V. CONCLUDING REMARK
We propose a full implementation of four-intensity
decoy-state MDIQKD. Even if the channels between the
users and UTP are asymmetric, our four-intensity pro-
δ(dB) η˜′(dB) Optimized key rate per pulse pair
0 0 1.7747 × 10−6
-7 5 1.5229 × 10−6
-8.5 4.5 2.2279 × 10−6
-8.75 4 2.2217 × 10−6
-8.75 4.5 2.2283 × 10−6
-8.75 5 2.2184 × 10−6
-9 4.5 2.2278 × 10−6
TABLE III: Optimized key rate with different δ and η˜′ with
the parameters in Table I.
5tocol still has a good performance. We also propose a
loss-compensation method. This method can improve
the key rate a lot in unstable channel.
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